By Nigel Layton

The past year has offered a clear reminder that global health security is tightly bound to economic security. Geopolitical tensions have escalated, multilateral institutions are under strain and supply chains – though more robust than in 2020 – remain exposed. Public finances are stretched heading into an election-heavy 2026, meaning governments and businesses have less capacity to absorb shocks.

Against this backdrop, pandemic readiness can no longer sit solely within the public-health domain. It is now a core financial-resilience test. COVID-19 showed how quickly a health emergency becomes a fiscal event: disrupting supply chains; reshaping capital allocation and exposing governance weaknesses. If a serious outbreak emerged today, it would meet a more fragmented global system than the one that responded in 2020. That should concern boards and finance leaders preparing their multiyear risk strategies.

At a recent conference I described the US withdrawal from elements of the WHO’s pandemic infrastructure as “monumental”. For decades, US influence helped ensure that vaccines and medicines reached the most vulnerable regions quickly. Its retreat – alongside rising political pressures in other major donor nations – has left gaps in global emergency response. When lower-income countries cannot access vaccines or treatments rapidly, pathogens circulate and mutate for longer, prolonging global economic uncertainty.

For UK businesses, that reality translates into practical considerations: more conservative supply-chain assumptions; higher working-capital requirements and intensified scrutiny of third-party risk. The world has become more volatile – increasing the cost of preparedness, but increasing the cost of failing to prepare even more.

COVID-19 showed that scientific breakthroughs matter little without the supply chain to deliver them. The UK mobilised vaccine production at pace, yet struggled to secure PPE and essential materials. Those weaknesses carried financial consequences: wasted procurement; fraud; stalled production and inefficient capital deployment.

While we cannot stockpile vaccines for unknown pathogens, we can stockpile critical inputs. We can invest in flexible manufacturing capacity. And we can ensure governance structures prevent the procurement failures seen during COVID-19. The UK has strengthened its stockpiling strategy, but progress does not equal preparedness. Boards now need to view supply resilience as integral to financial planning, not as an operational afterthought.

Despite the challenges, there are positive signs – industry and government are increasingly ‘talking the right language’ on preparedness, and public-private partnerships are improving. Approval protocols are becoming more flexible and AI is enhancing demand modelling, scenario planning and supply-chain visibility.

These developments matter because they reduce uncertainty for business. Faster regulatory pathways help companies plan manufacturing and capital expenditure with greater clarity. Better data-sharing and pre-agreed contingency arrangements make emergency mobilisation more efficient.

But partnerships must be built before a crisis, not during one. Agreements on procurement, surge capacity, data access and distribution need to exist now if they are to be effective when the next emergency emerges.

The UK’s regulatory agility, strong scientific base and responsive life sciences sector mean it is well-positioned to lead – if it continues investing in these partnerships.

Regulatory delays proved costly during COVID-19. Speed does not require lower standards; it requires processes that can match the pace of innovation. However, speed must come with integrity and emergency procurement environments are prone to fraud. Rapid onboarding of suppliers increases exposure to third-party misconduct. In my investigations work, these risks continue to dominate, especially in higher-risk regions.

For finance leaders, this is a financial-risk issue, not a compliance formality. Under the UK Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), liabilities extend to partner failures. Strengthening governance frameworks is essential to reducing both legal and economic exposure.

As organisations prepare their 2026 risk plans, they face a world of tighter fiscal margins, greater geopolitical turbulence and more mobile pathogens. Pandemic readiness belongs on board agendas – not as a hypothetical threat, but as a stress-test of financial stability.

The UK has made progress, but readiness is not fixed – it must be continually reinforced. Resilience requires preestablished partnership structures, governance frameworks capable of preventing procurement failures and regulatory processes that can move quickly without compromising standards. It’s also vital that supply-chain strategies are focused on essential inputs and there is sustained global engagement to fill emerging leadership gaps.

The UK has the tools, expertise and partnerships to strengthen its position. The next pandemic will test our ability to protect public finances and economic stability, but readiness is not built in the crisis – it is built long before it arrives.